The hearing will come to order.

Let me begin by welcoming our witnesses and thank them for

taking the time to come today and testify. I genuinely appreciate

it.

A little over a year ago, this committee held a hearing entitled

‘‘Darfur: A Plan B to Stop Genocide.’’ At that time, there were over

2 million people living in camps in Darfur, millions more at risk,

and an estimated 7,700 African Union peacekeepers. The United

Nations assumed joint control of the peacekeeping mission on December

31, 2007, but, from my perspective at least, the situation

seems to have improved very little.

Since January 1, 90,000 more people have been driven from their

homes, and, since that date, peacekeeping forces have seen a net

increase of only 293 troops, if my numbers are correct. Additional

police personnel are now present, and peacekeepers on the ground

are better equipped, but it defies my comprehension that the international

community has not managed to do better than we have.

Violence and banditry are still the order of the day. Last week,

the World Food Programme announced that it’s going to have to

cut its rations for people in Darfur in half because so many of its

trucks are being hijacked, and it cannot maintain supply lines.

Just yesterday, the head of the United Nations-African Union

mission into Darfur reported that it’s unlikely that the peacekeeping

force will be fully operational this year.

Another top U.N. official estimated that 300,000 people have died

in Darfur since the beginning of the conflict. That’s a very grim

juxtaposition of the world’s inability or unwillingness to act.

At the time of our hearing last April, the biggest obstacle to

peace seemed to be the refusal of the Sudanese Government to

allow U.N. peacekeepers in the country. Well, last June, Sudan

agreed to let them in, at least it agreed on paper.

The question is: Why have we seen so little progress over the

course of the year? Earlier this month, the U.N. Secretary General

published a report assessing the situation in Darfur in which he

expressed disappointment with, ‘‘the lack of progress on all fronts,’’

and his report spells out the dismal situation in stark terms. He

said, ‘‘The parties appear determined to pursue a military solution.

The political process is stalled. The deployment is progressing very

slowly. And the humanitarian situation is not improving.’’

This the best the international community can do in response to

genocide? It really is discouraging. And, from my perspective, I

don’t think it’s acceptable.

The purpose of this hearing is to get answers to some very basic

questions. And I want to make it clear I do not, nor does anyone

in this panel, hold the witnesses responsible for the lack of

progress. But, we need to get some answers. We’ve got to try to figure

out if there’s any way through this.

The basic questions I want to ask about are, What is delaying

the deployment of the full complement of 26,000 peacekeepers and

police? Sudanese obstruction? The failure of other countries to contribute

needed equipment, such as helicopters? The U.N. bureaucracy

that has been cited as a source of delay? Is it some or all of

the above? Is it the fact that since the last time we had a hearing—

the rebel groups have now morphed into 25 different identifiable

bands? I remember, several years ago, meeting with what was

then, I think, five or six rebel groups. The commanders came out

of the field in Darfur and met with me in Chad. And they were

somewhat dysfunctional then, but it’s now gone way beyond that.

The second question I want to ask about is: What is the U.N.

going to do to help to overcome these obstacles to deployment?

What is the United States doing to lead the way through or around

any of the impediments I’ve cited? Is it helicopters that are needed?

Then we should find a way to provide them, convince others to step

up, or actually, as I said to the President—I think my colleague

was with me—if that’s the only problem, appropriate the money

and build new helicopters here. Is the Sudanese obstruction the

reason? Five years into the conflict, this is simply not something

the international community should be continuing to tolerate. Are

bureaucrats getting in the way? Well, if that’s true—I don’t know

that it is, but it’s reported—if that’s true, it’s time to steamroll the

bureaucrats.

What is the current security and humanitarian situation in

Darfur on the ground today? What are the prospects for a peace

process between the government and the rebel groups, or maybe

even among the rebel groups? Why are we allowing Sudan to continue

to violate the U.N. ban on offensive military flights over

Darfur?

And finally, I would pose the same question I did a year ago. On

September the 9, 2004, in testimony before this committee, Secretary

of State Colin Powell—then Secretary of State—said clearly

that the killing in Darfur was genocide. Shortly thereafter, so did

President Bush. So, I now ask again, What are we doing about it?

Recent news accounts in the New York Times and elsewhere

have described bilateral talks between the United States and the

Government of Sudan held in Rome. These talks were headed up,

on the United States side, by Ambassador Williamson, who we’ll be

hearing from later this morning, and a high ranking Sudanese official

on their side. The newspaper article indicated that these talks

might lead to United States easing sanctions on Sudan, removing

Sudan designation as a state sponsor or terrorism, or taking other

steps to normalize relations. I know that the administration has

asked to discuss this issue in a classified forum, which I welcome,

and I’m sure my colleagues will—we can work out a time to make

us all available. But—and I’ve also been around long enough to

know that I don’t believe everything I read in the newspaper. And

so—but, absent the classified briefing, I’d like to state very clearly,

in terms strong enough to be heard all the way to Khartoum, that,

in my opinion, none of the steps should be considered until the Sudanese

Government ceases all attacks on civilians, allows U.N.

peacekeeper—peacekeeping mission full access to Darfur with the

freedom to carry out its mandate, disarms the janjaweed, whom it

unleashed on innocent villagers, and upholds its commitment to

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the South and the

Darfur Peace Agreement.

For 5 years, the people of Darfur have suffered death, deprivation,

and destruction. Government forces, Janjaweed, militia, and

rebel groups have all preyed upon civilians and aid workers trying

to help them. When the United Nations finally assumed joint control

of the peacekeeping missions, hopes rose that it would make

a real difference to the people in Darfur. Those hopes have not yet

been fulfilled. I truly want to know, as I expect my colleagues do,

why not, and what will it take to change the circumstances on the

ground? I don’t want to be here, a year from now, asking the same

questions to a new administration that I posed last April and just

posed again. Genocide is happening on our watch. The question is:

What is there, if anything, we can do about it? Because what we’re

doing now doesn’t seem to be working.

Thank you.

We’re going to, with your permission, after we hear from our first

witness, go to 7-minute rounds.

And I want to make it clear how much we appreciate, Dr. Lute,

you being here. I understand, under the rules, you are ‘‘briefing’’

us, as in representing the office in charge of the Department of

Field Support in the United Nations in New York; you are not here

to testify. That is not your role, nor is it the practice of the U.N.

But, we truly appreciate you taking the time to be here to brief us.

And, as I said, through the Office of our Special Envoy, we’ll also

seek a closed briefing, as well. But, we thank you, and welcome

you. And, again, please do not read into anything you heard from

me or the chairman that we’re looking at you to suggest that,

‘‘Geez, why haven’t you solved this?’’ This is a very, very difficult,

and maybe intractable, problem, but it is frustrating, and if it’s

frustrating to me and to the members here, it must be exceedingly

frustrating to you.

Well, thank you very much, Doctor. With your

permission, we’d like to ask a few questions, if that’s OK.

Let me begin where you ended. I think an awful lot of Americans—

and, I suspect, Europeans and others, as well—are sometimes

confused by the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking.

And, for example—we have a line—I’m informed by Chairman

Dodd that—a line that is all the way down the hallway, here,

of people wanting to come in to hear your testimony, and this is

an issue that has caught the heart, imagination, and attention of

people all around the world, because it seems so intractable, and

so many innocent people. I’ve only visited it once. I visited the

camps on the border in Chad, the northernmost camps. It’s amazing

what the U.N. is doing, keeping those folks alive in what is a

Godforsaken part of the world.

But, let me begin talking about peacekeeping versus peacemaking.

I would posit that there’s no peace to keep right now.

There is an agreement, of sorts. You mentioned engineering necessities—

capacity, self-sustaining capability. As I understand it,

Sudan—notwithstanding their assertions, Khartoum is holding up

supplies at the Port of Sudan, restricting communications equipment

that can come in, which is essential to a self-sustaining capacity

on the ground for any force. I may be mistaken, but I am

told, denying engineering capacity—that is, the very things that

come in to construct the capacity for troops to be self-sustaining—

and a number of other obstacles. And I would like to ask you to

contrast that to what I would suggest in the parlance is a slightly

different kind of force—EUFOR-Chad. The European Union is deploying,

quote, ‘‘a peacekeeping force’’ inside the Chad border with

Darfur, approximately 3,700 people. Most of these troops are

French. France has a long history, a former colony. They have an

airbase there that could be used. And Russia is contributing helicopters.

Now, one of the things that I’m a little bit confused about is that

it seems as though the distinction between, in broad terms, the

European Union’s action to deploy 3,700 troops that are self-sustaining,

know how to shoot straight, are organized, are capable—

and that’s not a criticism of the AU. I met with the AU commanders

on the ground; they desperately need everything from infrastructure

to training to equipment. And I know the Rwandans

are probably ahead of the game, because of the training they’ve

gotten, and probably the most capable of the AU forces. But, how

would things change for you if the continued resistance from the

various sectors for deployment of this force, the peacekeeping force

that you are charged with, if, in fact, there is a deployment of 2,500

to 4,000 NATO troops on the ground establishing, without having

to any longer put up with the interminable delays of the Sudanese

Government, just within west Darfur and just initially—which they

could do—not establish peace, but establish some order, set the

table, set the groundwork for all that infrastructure you’re talking

about. I know that’s heretical, I know no one but me supports

that—I shouldn’t say ‘‘no one,’’ but not many people—and I’m not

sure, at this point, that its force would be available; but, how would

that change your circumstance? Would it just make it impossible,

or would it, in fact, send a message to Khartoum that there are

certain actions that when countries engage in genocide, they forfeit

their sovereignty, that the international community has a right to

come in to protect people?

And I want to make it clear—it’s a long question; it’s the only

question I’ll ask—I want to make it clear what Senator Lugar

pointed out in his statement, I don’t think that portends for a political

settlement. That will not create a political settlement. That

will not alter a lot of the other pieces on the ground. But, one thing

it would do, it would sure in hell shut down the Janjaweed real

quickly, and it would blow away those rebel groups that are engaged,

real quickly, in the area where they were. Is that a good

thing or a bad thing, if it could happen?

Right.

My guess is, it’ll be stood up 20 times faster than

your operation.

No; I understand. Yes.

If I could interject, just a second, back in 1988

I proposed that there be a small standing force under U.N. Charter.

We’re allowed to have that happen if the U.N. votes for it. It

received a very cold reception here in the United States, and not

a very warm reception anywhere else. And all we were calling for

is, in the post-cold war, that there be a provision to have this

peacekeeping capacity. Senator Lugar is trying to—with the help of

me and others, trying to provide such a capacity here at home,

civilian as well. But, as they say, it’s above both our pay grades.

But, I think it’s a worthwhile thing to pursue again.

Doctor, let me—I just have one comment and

maybe one question, then we’ll let you go. First of all, you live in

a busy household. You’re taking care of Darfur, and your husband

is taking care of Iraq and Afghanistan. No easy problems in your

house.

It must be great kitchen-table discussion.

Not a lot of pillow talk.

Let me say to you what I said at the outset. I just know more

about you, maybe, than some of my colleagues do, because some of

my staff worked with you. You are held in exceedingly high regard,

and I mean that sincerely. I think you’re really smart and you’re

really in a difficult spot.

I’d like to—not for you to comment, unless you choose to, but I

think that we all know why things have dragged on as long as they

have. I don’t know of any situation that has spontaneously solved

itself like the situation in Somalia, in the North/South issue, or

Darfur.

I went to see one of your former military colleagues, and a colleague

of your husband of similar rank, 4 years ago, and he gathered

together a group of his compatriots, who had stars and bars

on their shoulders from NATO, and I spent some time sitting in

the headquarters in Europe, and I said, ‘‘What would it take to stabilize

the situation in Darfur?’’ This was 4 years ago, now. And

they whipped out a plan. And the bottom line was, to oversimplify

it, 2,500 to 3,500 NATO forces, trainers to go in, cargo planes, airlift

capacity, helicopters—but, to go in and shut down the

Janjaweed. I visited an airbase in Chad, which you’re familiar

with, former French base, where you could impose the no-fly zone.

I know that would impact on what already is impacted on anyway—

food delivery and aid. But, the answers that I got from the

military was, ‘‘We can do this, but there’s not any political will to

do this, in Europe or in the United States, for that matter.’’ And

it was suggested, by one general in particular, that if the President

of the United States made this an issue, took it to the forefront at

the NAC, that this could get done. This could get done.

Now, things have deteriorated significantly since then. Our situation,

in my view, in Iraq has complicated things. You had a great

expression; I can’t remember it exactly—but, ‘‘If you’re looking for

an excuse, you can find one,’’ or whatever the phrase you used before.

Now, I had called for the unilateral use of American forces,

absent NATO’s willingness to move. Didn’t get any reception here

in the Congress, didn’t get any reception in Iowa or anywhere else.

And I said if I were in that spot—yes, with present company excluded,

present company excluded——

That’s why we both got out so quickly.

But, all——

That’s right.

We spent more time endorsing one another in

Iowa, and it probably was the kiss of death when I said, ‘‘If I

wasn’t in, I’d be for him.’’ And he said the same. That was it. So,

we both came home.

But, all kidding aside, the arguments now—and

I may ask you to comment on one aspect of what I’m going to say—

only one, because you’re not in a position, in your present role, to

comment on all of them—there’s an argument that, because of

Iraq—whether we made mistakes or everything we did was right—

we now have a, ‘‘Muslim problem’’ worldwide. So, for the United

States to go in and take on a Muslim government in Khartoum

that is, in my view, responsible for the killing, we would lose further

standing throughout the Muslim world. So, that’s one of the

‘‘why we can’t’’—we, the United States, can’t do anything unilaterally.

China, big problem. China could be a major part of the solution.

But, China has a—oil resource stream there. They don’t want to be

any part of any real crack down on Khartoum.

The no-fly zone. The very community that I care most about, and

we all do, the humanitarian community, was very critical of my

suggesting imposing a no-fly zone. Understandably. I understand

that. But, what I predicted happened anyway, they’re not able to

deliver the food anyway now.

And then, there’s this overarching concern here in the United

States, which totally understandable, starts on my pillow with my

wife, who’s also a doctor, who says, ‘‘Joe, I don’t want us to be involved

in any more. I don’t want to send my son. He’s already

going to Iraq. I don’t want him going other places.’’ I mean, we

can’t solve this. We can’t solve this.

One thing I want you to comment on—there are all the

pushbacks I’ve been getting for 4 years. And I’m not saying they’re

not legitimate. I think this is a very tough call. But, were I making

the call, I would, literally, not figuratively, unilaterally deploy U.S.

forces. I would do it. NATO would follow, because they’d have no

choice, in my humble opinion. And I believe, when a nation engages

in genocide, it forfeits its right to claim sovereignty. And so,

I would not even consult with Khartoum. That would leave a lot

of problems. A lot of problems. But, I think we have to face up to

the fact that if we really want action, there’s only one way it’s

going to happen: If the United States mobilizes the rest of the

world and says, ‘‘We’re going to act.’’ Short of that, no one else is.

No one else is. In the near term.

That’s why I raised the issue of the Euro-U.N. force in Chad.

And—because you could argue the same problems exist there.

We’re siding with the Chadian Government against the rebels in

Chad. We’re in a position where we’re making a judgment. We’re

engaged in the sovereignty issue in Chad. We’re dealing with all

the same problems, except it’s more doable in Chad, so we’re prepared

to do it, in my view.

So, here’s the point, and I apologize for going on. Absent the

United States leading the way and deciding to go in, providing the

cargo capability, providing the helicopters—I mean, the idea of the

United States of America with a half-a-trillion-dollar military budget

now? It’s about a half a trillion, isn’t it? A half a trillion dollars.

As I said to the President, ‘‘We can’t find eight helicopters?’’ Literally,

if I were President, or if Roosevelt were President, guess

what? He’d manufacture them. Literally, not figuratively. We’d

pass legislation, special authorization, a supplemental, authorizing

the construction of eight new helicopters. We’d go to Boeing, whoever,

and say, ‘‘Build ’em.’’

So, we go to Connecticut and——

And do it.

That might end up being the biggest problem of

building them.

The Senator from Pennsylvania and I might

want it at Boeing, down in south Philly. All kidding aside, you

know, short of that, though, for us to go at the U.N. for not doing

something, I find it inconsistent—what can you all do?

So, here’s my question, after that long, long prelude. In the experience

of you and your colleagues in the peacekeeping side of the

mission, is there, for lack of a better phrase, an ‘‘allergy’’ to U.S.

forces being involved, in any capacity, in a country led by a Muslim

government? Is it—do you hear, from your colleagues at the United

Nations, talk that I hear coming from those who don’t want us to—

and there’s good reasons not to want to get engaged in a military

operation unilaterally in the United States after asking people to

help, but not being willing to do it—but would it be different if

the—Khartoum were not a Muslim government? How much does

that play, when you’re putting together forces, when you’re pushing

for engineers, when we’re trying to get communications equipment

in—how much of it is cast in the light of the United States imposing

its view on another Muslim country? Do you hear that chatter?

Is that part of what goes on up in New York? Or is it—if you’re

able to—and you can demure, obviously, if you wish, because,

again, you’re in a difficult position. But, I’d like to have a sense of

that.

Well, let me go back. We both would agree, we’re

not really peacekeeping here. We’ve got to establish peace. I mean,

I would argue, this is a helluva lot more like when I was pushing

Clinton to go into Bosnia. This is a helluva lot more like ending

genocide, where we had to unilaterally act. We went to the United

Nations, the United Nations was unwilling to act, and we eventually

go the point where, quite frankly, I think, the French and others

were shamed into acting, once we decided we were going to act.

Up to that time, people sat—I sat in Sarajevo, talking to people

who had been butchered, their families, I mean, literally 2, 3 days

before. And Lord Owen—the Foreign Minister of Great Britain—

was talking about the cantonization of Bosnia. And we were talking

about getting the U.N. in. The U.N. was the problem. Not their

fault. The U.N. stood there and watched people in Srebrenica get

loaded onto trucks, with the whole world watching, and drug off to

stand above a pit, get their brains blown out, and put in mass

graves. The U.N. did not intentionally, but it indirectly facilitated

it. I remember speaking with General Rose, heading up the U.N.,

wearing a blue helmet, him telling me, ‘‘You can’t bring in air

power, you may strike one of the U.N. forces.’’

So, I mean, at some point, you’ve got to establish the peace. I’m

talking much too much. But, my frustration is, like yours, intense.

I’ve concluded there’s no way anything’s going to happen unless the

President of the United States says something’s going to happen.

And they’re going to have to take a great risk. Other than that,

we’re going to beat up on you, we’re going to beat up on the U.N.,

and the truth of the matter is, it is beyond the capacity of the U.N.,

without the willingness of Khartoum to genuinely cooperate, and

without the willingness of the rebels to genuinely begin to negotiate,

and, in the meantime, as that old expression attributable to

the world-famous economist says, in the long run, they’ll all be

dead. They’ll all be dead in the long run. Nothing is—the best thing

that’s happened so far, in my opinion, Doctor, is the fact that you

and the EU have committed 3,700 EU troops on the ground in

Chad because that will end what’s happening in those camps. It

will significantly reduce the killing going on in the camps and people

outside the camps. It will impact the cross-border raids. Short

of that, I don’t know what you can do.

But, do you hear any talk about this Muslim-U.S. conundrum?

Is that a topic of discussion?

I—again, I’ll yield to anybody who has any question—

I would like to give to you time, and I know we have a second

panel, and my staff is telling me ‘‘get going,’’ here. But, I want to

note—article 43 says, ‘‘All members of the United Nations, in order

to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,

undertake to make available to the Security Council on its

call, in accordance with special agreement or agreements, armed

forces assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary

purpose,’’ et cetera, et cetera. That’s article 43, section 1.

For your benefit, I’m going to give you a copy of that proposal I

made in 1992——

And I would appreciate your constructive

criticism of whether or not it may be more feasible today

than it was in 1992, because it is—it’s more along the lines of what

you were saying regarding what you need to have to effect this capacity.

So, are there any further questions for the Doctor?

Doctor, again, thank you for your service. What

rank were you in the military?

Well, I’ll tell you what, you talk like a really

tough sergeant-major.

I tell you what, I don’t think anybody gave you

any guff.

And I’m glad——

You’re in the position you’re in.

Well, it’s our privilege to have you here. And it

seems to me it’s our obligation, as one of the leaders in the world,

to try to get the major nations to move toward a position where we

establish peace before you have to go keep it.

But, at any rate, thank you very, very much, Doctor.

Our next panel, and our last panel, is the Honorable Richard

Williamson, the President of—Special Envoy to Sudan, to whom a

lot of the questions we had might more appropriately be directed;

and the Honorable Katherine Almquist, who is the Assistant Administrator

for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Both have equally difficult jobs. I welcome them. And I particularly

welcome back Mr. Williamson, the Special Envoy, whose predecessor

had some very strong words, a year ago. We may have been

better if we had listened to him, I think.

But, at any rate, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for

being here. Thank you for your patience. And, why don’t we recognize

you for your statements in the order in which you were called.

And if you do not want to do your whole statement, we will include

it in the record, and you can summarize. But, the floor is yours.

Good to have you. Thank you.

Thank you.

And, on behalf of all of us, we really do appreciate the significant

physical risk that you and your colleagues have taken.

We’ll do 7-minute rounds, if that’s OK.

And, Ambassador, I have some questions for you, but I’d like to

make them fairly pointed. If you can give me relatively short answers

and expand on it later, if you wish, it would be helpful as

I try to stay within my time, here.

We all know the story. December 31, the U.N. joined the African

Union, and took charge, 7,700 folks on the ground then, we’re now

up to 9,200 folks on the ground to protect 4 million people in the

affected area. It’s 26,000 authorized. What’s the primary obstacle,

if you had to summarize it? And I’m asking you to summarize it

for me. What’s the primary obstacle to the U.N.-African Union

force achieving operational capacity? Why haven’t they achieved it

by now?

Mr. Ambassador, how long do you think it’s

going to take to have a sufficient number of troops trained to actually

get to the point where we have 26,000 deployed? When I met

with the commander of the AU on the border—this is now, how

many years ago?—4 years—he said the mandate he had then was

peacekeeping primarily by monitoring, and his folks—his troops

would actually stand there and watch. There wasn’t much they

could do, they’d stand there and watch the Janjaweed make a son

rape his mother. He showed us vivid photographs that they had.

He said, ‘‘But, there’s nothing we can do. Our mandate is—we cannot—

we cannot intervene.’’

So, I assume the folks we’re training are trained to shoot straight

and keep the peace. In your professional estimation, how much

longer will it take for us to have help trained, with the $100 million

we have—and I understand the Rwandans are doing pretty

well—how long will it take to get a contingent of 26,000 forces on

the ground?

Sure.

Right.

So, if we’re lucky, we’ll get around 15,000 forces

on the ground within the next 6 months.

Seven months.

Gotcha.

Well, they never have, have they? I mean——

I mean, the U.N. doesn’t have that

capacity, do they?

Yeah, but do they have——

Cargo planes? Do they have——

Helicopters? Do they——

They haven’t got that——

But—spent on what?

No, no; I got that. I’m just trying to—I’m trying

to find—focus on one thing.

The physical requirements to logistically put

26,000 trained African Union forces, with U.N. Blue Helmets leading

them, on the ground in Darfur. I understand the other pieces,

and they’re legitimate. But, I’m curious—we—you say ‘‘by the end

of this calendar year,’’ 7 months from now, whatever it is, 8

months, we will have—the United States will have trained another

6,500 forces.

Total.

See, that’s what I’m saying. Sixty-five new ones,

9,200 total. There’s 9,200 on the ground now, not all trained by us.

So that we would have roughly 15-16,000 troops,

at least theoretically, available, 93 there, another 65 to come, but

they’ll be trained by the end of the year—and I understand, by the

way, I say to both of you, that, you know, putting boots on the

ground doesn’t solve the political problem, but that’s an interesting

thing; it keeps my daughter alive, it keeps my son alive, it keeps

my wife from being raped, it keeps me being put in a grave. So,

it does have some effect. You know, as I said, I’ll use the phrase

again, in the long run, they’ll all be dead if we don’t act—but, anyway,

back to the question. It’s not a criticism, it’s a question, a genuine

question. What is the expectation that you have, as a seasoned

diplomat involved in these kinds of things—nothing quite

like this, but you’ve been involved in an awful lot by this time next

year, will there be 15,000 qualified forces on the ground, with communications

equipment, with the ability and the infrastructure to

be able to maintain, logistically, 15,000 troops that are able to

exert force to keep the peace on the ground?

Right.

OK.

Right.

No; again, I’m not taking issue with that. What

I’m trying to get at is: What, in the meantime, is going to happen

while this deployment goes on? Is there anything we could do, temporarily,

that will prevent the Janjaweed being transported by Sudanese

helicopters, sitting above villages, wiping people out, riding

in on horseback, wiping out and burning villages to the ground?

Would a no-fly zone, which is totally within our wheelhouse to be

able to do—would that be helpful? Would that be hurtful? What

can we do to tell those people in the camps you’ve visited, I’ve visited,

others visited, that, ‘‘By the way, there’s a chance you’ll be

alive next year by the time we get these troops on the ground?’’ Is

there anything we can do?

Increasing, not creating. Increasing.

China.

Not likely. Is it?

Okay. My time’s up; I’m over.

Let me just conclude by saying, you know, we heard from the

U.N. representative earlier about the need for engineers on the

ground. I understand Norway just withdrew their offer, after the

Sudanese stonewalling that took place. I understand it’s a possibility

to, maybe, accept troops from Thailand and Nepal. The Chinese

may support these troops to go, that may be a possibility.

They may have a self-interest in that. But, all kidding aside, I don’t

see anything that is going to, in the near term—meaning, the next

2, 3, 4, 5, 6 months—not be, on New Year’s Day, when we look at

the numbers, see another 90-100,000, 125,000 innocent women and

children either dead or displaced. I don’t know what happens in the

meantime. And that’s the part I’m focused on. But, I’ve spoken too

long.